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COMMENT
DO-IT-YOURSELF PRIVACY: THE NEED
FOR COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL
PRIVACY LEGISLATION WITH A
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
ALEC WHEATLEY*
INTRODUCTION
On Black Friday 2013, at the height of the holiday shopping season,
seventy million1 Target customer records were hacked in one of the larg-
est U.S. retail data breaches to date.2  The hacked data included account
numbers and payment card information as well as the personal data of
customers.3  The breach required banks to perform a massive reissuance
of credit cards to customers, costing hundreds of millions of dollars,4 and
created the need for Target customers who had recently shopped at the
retailer to sign up for credit monitoring services as protection against
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Golden Gate University School of Law; B.A. Philosophy,
December 2007, University of California, Berkeley.  I would like to thank Professor William
Gallagher, Adjunct Professor Jessica Blazer, and Adjunct Professor Ed Baskauskas for providing
thoughtful read-throughs and commentary prior to publication.  Thanks and deepest appreciation to
my family for their love and support throughout law school.
1 Brian Krebs, The Target Breach, by the Numbers, KREBS ON SECURITY (May 6, 2014), http:/
/krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/the-target-breach-by-the-numbers/.
2 Michael Riley, Ben Elgin, Dune Lawrence & Carol Matlack, Missed Alarms and 40 Million
Stolen Credit Card Numbers: How Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK: TECHNOLOGY, Mar.
13, 2014, www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-hack-of-credit-
card-data#p1.
3 Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the Breach Numbers Grow, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/target-breach-affected-70-million-customers.
html?_r=0 (reporting that customer names and phone numbers, as well as physical and email ad-
dresses, were taken).
4 Jennifer Bjorhus, Banks Have Replaced 15.3 Million Cards Since Target Breach, STAR-
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future unauthorized charges to their accounts.  Both banks and consum-
ers have brought lawsuits against Target on account of the breach.5  The
breach has raised concerns that Target did not take the steps necessary to
adequately protect the personal information of its customers.6
The risk is now greater than ever that consumers will have their
personal data misappropriated.  The recent Target breach demonstrates
how vulnerable consumers can become through the simple act of going
to the store and using a credit card.  Both brick-and-mortar (think
WalMart) and Internet-only (think Amazon) national retailers process
huge numbers of customer transactions every day.  The fact that modern
retailers operate on such a large scale necessitates the consolidation of
customer data into large databases, where it is stored and mined using
big data analytics.7  Such consolidation poses severe risks to consumers
in the event that those databases are breached.  Target is not alone in
being a target for data thieves.  In the months following the Target
breach, Neiman Marcus,8 Michaels,9 and Home Depot10 all suffered
high-profile breaches related to stolen customer credit card information.
Data security is only one slice of the privacy pie.  Consumers have
more to fear than just a breach of their financial information.  They have
to be wary of companies that change privacy policies without notice,
publish their personal email contacts without consent, and sell their per-
sonal information to advertisers for a profit.11  In fact, companies are
continually finding new ways to leverage the customer data they control
by analyzing customer buying trends to discover new insights, which
they can sell for a profit.  In addition, with the rise of the Internet of
5 Ed Treleven, Class Action Lawsuit Filed Here Against Target over Huge Data Breach, WIS.
ST. J., Feb. 15, 2014 (8:30 AM), http://host.madison.com/news/local/class-action-lawsuit-filed-here-
against-target-over-huge-data/article_6731b897-afa9-59cb-8cfa-86a8022b3cb2.html.
6 Riley et al., supra note 2 (noting that although Target had a security system in place, it did
not follow up when security alarms were raised).
7 See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRE-
SERVING VALUES (2014), available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy
_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf (reviewing the impact Big Data is having, and will continue to have,
on many aspects of society).
8 Ben Elgin, Dune Lawrence & Michael Riley, Neiman Marcus Hackers Set Off 60,000 Alerts
While Bagging Credit Card Data, BLOOMBERG BUS., Feb. 21, 2014, www.bloomberg.com/bw/arti
cles/2014-02-21/neiman-marcus-hackers-set-off-60-000-alerts-while-bagging-credit-card-data.
9 Brian Krebs, 3 Million Customer Credit, Debit Cards Stolen in Michaels, Aaron Brothers
Breaches, KREBS ON SECURITY (Apr. 17, 2014), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/04/3-million-cus
tomer-credit-debit-cards-stolen-in-michaels-aaron-brothers-breaches/.
10 Ben Elgin, Michael Riley & Dune Lawrence, Home Depot Hacked After Months of Secur-
ity Warnings, BLOOMBERG BUS., Sept. 18, 2014, www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-09-18/home
-depot-hacked-wide-open.
11 See infra Part III (discussing FTC enforcement actions against companies for violations of
consumer privacy).
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Things,12 the data available about consumer habits is set to increase dra-
matically.  This in turn has encouraged the rise of Big Data, which values
the collection and analysis of data above all else and drives companies to
collect and store ever-greater amounts of consumer data.13
Consumer desire for more privacy online has pushed a market for
new social media apps claiming heightened privacy protections.  Michael
Heyward, co-founder and CEO of a new application called “Whisper,”
claims that the app is the “the safest place on the internet.”14  Ironically,
the app has been found to track the locations of users even when they
have explicitly opted out by turning the app geolocation feature off.15
The risk of breach from hackers and the fact that even a company
that claims to strongly value privacy is tracking its users both implicate
consumer privacy rights and demonstrate that the need is greater than
ever for a comprehensive federal privacy law that sets the standard for
how consumer data is to be stored and used.16
This Comment is concerned with informational privacy, as opposed
to decisional privacy.17  Informational privacy concerns the collection
and use of personally identifiable information (PII),18 which includes the
personal details that consumers give to companies either online or face-
to-face as a normal part of doing business with them.19  The information
that companies glean from their customers’ buying habits often results in
the creation of highly detailed customer dossiers, reflecting a large num-
ber of consumers’ attributes.20
12 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 7, at 2.
13 See generally id.
14 Paul Lewis & Dominic Rushe, Revealed: How Whisper App Tracks “Anonymous” Users,
GUARDIAN:  TECH., Oct. 16, 2014 (11:35 EDT), www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/16/-sp-re
vealed-whisper-app-tracking-users.
15 Id.
16 This is not to say that companies can ever become breach-proof, but a privacy law that sets
minimum requirements for handling customer information would be an important step toward mak-
ing data more secure.
17 Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds: United States Privacy
Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 357, 360 (2000) (distinguish-
ing between “informational privacy,” which concerns control and use of personal information, and
“autonomy privacy,” which concerns personal decisions and choices).
18 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of
Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies app. 8 (June 25, 2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-23.pdf (PII “refers to information that can be used to distin-
guish or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other personal or identi-
fying information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual”).
19 In addition, through the use of loyalty cards and purchase tracking, companies are able to
aggregate additional information about consumers to create detailed customer profiles.
20 Privacy and Consumer Profiling, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, https://epic.org/pri
vacy/profiling (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (customer profile information may include details such as
marital status, age, sex, race, geography, health information, religion, and income).
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Despite the fact that there is an enormous amount of consumer data
being collected every day by companies, there is no comprehensive fed-
eral law establishing the proper standards for how that data is to be se-
curely stored and transferred.21  Once a consumer has consented to a
company’s collection of his or her personal information, with few excep-
tions the company is free to use it as it wishes.22  When consumers share
information with a company online, they should be able to feel confident
that it will not be shared with third parties without their permission, and
if it is stored, that it will be properly stored.  Strict guidelines need to be
laid down that describe the proper scope of use for consumer data based
on the context in which that information is given.23  This will prevent
companies from exceeding the scope of consent and traveling outside the
expectations consumers have regarding how companies will use their
personal data.
Furthermore, the notice-and-consent model for privacy that currently
predominates in unregulated industries in the United States has been
roundly criticized as a failure.24  Often taking the form of End User Li-
cense Agreements (EULAs) or Terms and Conditions forms, these no-
tices are prohibitively long and written in legalese that most consumers
do not understand.25  The result is that no one reads the terms and condi-
tions for a given product or service.26  Stories in recent news have
demonstrated time and again that when faced with the prospect of read-
21 Congress has chosen to focus on industry-specific laws to create standards for how data is
handled. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq. (Westlaw 2015) (credit
information), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 et seq. (Westlaw 2015) (financial infor-
mation); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–19145, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.) (medical information).
22 Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1880 (2013) (“Consent legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or dis-
closure of personal data.”).
23 Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, DAEDALUS, J. AM. ACAD.
ARTS & SCI., Fall 2011, at 32, 43–44.
24 E.g., id. at 32, 34; FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 2 (2012), available at www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-
rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf; DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY
TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DY-
NAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 23 (2010), available at www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
iptf_privacy_greenpaper_12162010.pdf.
25 Nissenbaum, supra note 23, at 32, 35.
26 Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read The
Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014)
(“[O]nly one or two in 1,000 shoppers access a product’s EULA for at least 1 second . . . .”).
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ing a lengthy EULA, consumers just agree and move on.27  A compre-
hensive federal privacy law could address these concerns.
Additionally, the primary enforcer of privacy law, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), does not have the capacity to enforce every privacy
violation claim of which it is made aware.28  While the FTC has an ex-
cellent track record of obtaining settlements with consumer privacy in-
fringers, because of its limited budget it goes after only the biggest
companies, leaving many smaller privacy infringements unremedied.29
Even when the FTC does obtain a settlement, it does not require a com-
pany to admit to wrongdoing, and the settlement does not have the
weight of precedent.30
This Comment will argue that there is a significant gap in federal
privacy law that must be addressed.  New federal legislation is needed to
fill this gap and would be preferable to a mishmash of potentially con-
flicting state laws currently in development that will make compliance
more difficult for companies that do business online.31  The incorporeal
nature of the Internet also cuts against relying on state legislation, be-
cause it makes it difficult to determine the proper jurisdiction for a
claimed privacy violation, creating complex choice-of-law disputes.32
Furthermore, due to the intangible nature of PII, it is often difficult
for plaintiffs to show damages from a privacy violation.33  Without mate-
rial damages to claim in a complaint, privacy plaintiffs have no standing
to be in federal court.34  A federal law providing a private right of action
27 Rachel Feltman, Londoners Accidentally Pay for Free Wi-Fi with a Firstborn, Because No
One Reads Anymore, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-sci
ence/wp/2014/09/29/londoners-accidentally-pay-for-free-wi-fi-with-a-firstborn-because-no-one-
reads-anymore (describing Wi-Fi terms and conditions clause that offered free Internet in exchange
for the user’s firstborn child); Larry Magid, It Pays To Read License Agreements, PC PITSTOP,
www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (reporting that after 3,000
downloaders missed it, one man came forward to claim $1,000 cash prize hidden in EULA).
28 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2014).
29 Id. (stating that the FTC averages around ten enforcement actions a year, although that
number has been steadily increasing).
30 Cf. id. at 620 (noting that privacy professionals nevertheless still treat FTC enforcement
actions as having precedential weight).
31 WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 39 (2012),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
32 The Internet has given rise to numerous disputes concerning international jurisdiction as
well.  For a discussion of choice-of-law issues arising from electronic contracts, see Aristotle G.
Mirzaian, Y2K Who Cares? We Have Bigger Problems: Choice of Law in Electronic Contracts, 6
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 20 (2000).
33 Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information, in SE-
CURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 111, 115 (Anupam Chander, Lauren Gelman & Margaret
Jane Radin eds., 2008).
34 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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for a mere violation is needed to keep privacy plaintiffs from being
kicked out of federal courts on jurisdictional grounds.  A new federal law
providing a private right of action would strengthen consumers’ confi-
dence that their rights will be protected and encourage them to continue
to participate in the developing digital economy, even as new technolo-
gies continue to make us more closely connected.
Part I of this Comment will describe how the concept of privacy has
evolved over time, from its original constitutional conception to our
modern informational conception.  It will also discuss the self-regulation
approach to privacy and its reliance on notice and consent.  Part II will
discuss the current state of federal privacy law and its shortcomings for a
plaintiff attempting to bring a claim in federal court.  Part III will de-
scribe the role of the FTC as the primary enforcer of privacy rights.  Fi-
nally, Part IV will outline the features a new comprehensive federal
online privacy law should embody.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVACY
In our modern hyper-connected world, the need for privacy protec-
tions is greater than it has ever been.  However, our contemporary con-
ception of privacy is somewhat different than it was when the word first
came into common usage.  In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
published their famous article, The Right to Privacy,35 in response to the
invention of the handheld camera.36  They adapted Judge Cooley’s “right
to be left alone” phrase from his treatise on torts37 and framed it for a
larger audience as a new right.38  They feared that as new technologies
developed, a person’s private life would require greater protection, thus
necessitating a new right of privacy.
Warren and Brandeis’s notion of privacy concerned decisional pri-
vacy, i.e., one’s ability to make personal decisions without the intrusion
of government or society at large.  This conception is grounded in the
idea that our constitutional guarantees create “zones of privacy” protect-
ing the most intimate areas of life, such as the familial home.39  This
35 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
36 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 11 (4th ed. 2011)
(discussing how Warren and Brandeis worried about the contemporary media of their day).
37 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888).
38 Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law–Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966) (stating that Warren and Brandeis article is likely the “most
influential law article of all”).
39 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965).
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol45/iss3/4
2015] Do-It-Yourself Privacy 271
conception should be distinguished from informational privacy, in that
the latter is concerned with the protection of personal details rather than
being left alone.
Consumers are now sharing more information than ever, and that
data must be protected.  In Warren and Brandeis’s time, it was likely
unthinkable how much personal information would be stored about each
person in the technological age.  Decisional privacy is still important, but
the sheer volume of personal data in cyberspace means that informational
privacy has taken center stage for the average consumer.
In 1960, seventy years after Warren and Brandeis wrote their article,
William Prosser organized the concept of invasion of privacy into four
distinct torts: intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts,
false light, and appropriation of likeness.40  The four-tort scheme he de-
vised imposed an order on privacy law, but that order also gave privacy
law a rigidity it did not previously have.41  It resulted in privacy law
being unable to adapt to new changes in technology or developments in
contemporary culture.42  For example, these torts are not equipped to
deal with informational privacy, because they are concerned with a per-
son’s “interest in solitude.”43  This is inapposite to many common in-
stances nowadays, such as when a consumer reaches out and furnishes
his or her personal information to a company in order to receive goods
and services.  Privacy concerns have shifted from wanting to “be left
alone,” to wanting to feel that personal information is secure in the hands
of companies who hold it.  There is a need for legislation that can ade-
quately address the intricacies of how consumers expect their informa-
tion to be handled.  This requires a subtlety that the four original privacy
torts are unable to furnish.44
In addition, the tort model of privacy causes courts to look for con-
crete injury in a privacy case for which to award damages.  However,
due to the nature of privacy claims, this is often an impossible task.45
When a company fails to follow its own privacy policy and shares a
consumer’s personal information without permission, there is no con-
40 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
41 See generally Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Leg-
acy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010).
42 Id. at 1890.
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977).
44 Richards & Solove, supra note 41, at 1921.
45 Solove, supra note 33, at 115–16 (observing that concrete harms from a privacy infringe-
ment may not appear for years, which makes proving a causal connection very difficult).
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crete damage to the information.46  However, that does not mean that the
consumer has not been harmed.
In regulating privacy online, the United States has preferred to let
businesses take a self-regulation approach.47  Self-regulation is consid-
ered the “least intrusive and most efficient means” to use in such a rap-
idly evolving area as the Internet.48  This approach relies on notice and
consent, whereby a company is required to provide notice to consumers
of how it will collect and use their information, and consumers consent
by using the goods or services the company provides.49  Ideally, the no-
tice-and-consent system allows market forces to dictate in a flexible way
which privacy practices consumers find most agreeable, without the need
for paternalistic regulatory oversight.50
However, notice-and-consent is broken.51  The current way compa-
nies provide notice, usually through privacy policies or terms-of-service
agreements, is not an effective method of informing consumers about
impacts to their privacy.52  It would take a prohibitively long time to read
even a fraction of the privacy policies a consumer may encounter online
in a given day.53  In addition, it is nearly impossible for consumers to
weigh the convenience of using a company’s services against the long-
term effects to their privacy stemming from the myriad ways a company
may use their personal information.54  The result is that consumers do
not read privacy policies, and if they do, they do not understand them.
Thus, the checks and balances that the notice-and-consent system was
designed to provide have failed to materialize.55
46 See, e.g., In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013
WL 1283236, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (finding that Google’s covert collection of plaintiffs’
PII resulted in no diminution of it’s value).
47 FTC, SELF REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (1999), availa-
ble at www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/self-regulation-privacy-onlinea-federal-trade-
commission-report-congress/1999self-regulationreport.pdf.
48 Id. (“[S]elf-regulation is the least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure fair informa-
tion practices, given the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet and computer technology.”).
49 Felix T. Wu, The Constitutionality of Consumer Privacy Regulation, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 69, 71 (2013) (describing “notice and choice” instead of “notice and consent”).
50 Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 929 (2013).
51 E.g., Nissenbaum, supra note 23, at 32, 34; FTC, supra note 24, at 2; DEP’T OF COMMERCE
INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 23.
52 Wu, supra note 49, at 71.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Bakos et al., supra note 26, at 3 (“[O]nly one or two in 1,000 shoppers access a product’s
EULA for at least 1 second . . . .”); Feltman, supra note 27 (describing Wi-Fi terms and conditions
clause that offered free Internet in exchange for the user’s firstborn child).
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II. CURRENT FEDERAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION56
The Privacy Act of 1974 represented the first attempt by Congress to
address privacy concerns.57  At that time, social security numbers were
still in wide use by government organizations to provide access to user
accounts.58  Congress drafted the Privacy Act in order to limit the use of
social security numbers because “common numerical identifiers” do not
make secure passwords.59  However, in drafting the Act, Congress made
it applicable only to government agencies, thus allowing all private use
of social security numbers to escape the enforcement of the Act.60
The advent of the Internet again changed the way we conceive of
privacy.  In the early days of the Internet, Congress passed the Wiretap
Act61 and the Stored Communications Act62 as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).63  However, the Act was
drafted when much of the technology making up the Internet was still
evolving, and it has become clearly inadequate for the ways consumers
now use the Internet to email, engage in social networks, and shop.64
For example, the ECPA distinguishes between real-time communi-
cations and stored records, providing reduced protections for the latter.65
This made sense when storing electronic materials was prohibitively ex-
pensive, simply because it was so uncommon that it presented a lower
risk than that posed by real-time interceptions.66  In the present day,
however, server storage is so cheap that is common to retain all emails a
consumer has ever received, or in the case of Facebook, every click a
user has ever made while using its site.67  In addition, now that cloud
computing allows consumers to share private content across multiple de-
vices, the reduced protection provided to stored data puts much more
56 This Comment is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of available federal privacy
legislation.  It instead offers a sampling of laws being used by consumers to protect their privacy in
order to show the laws’ deficiencies, and the need for new comprehensive legislation.
57 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (Westlaw 2015).
58 Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (D. Del. 1982).
59 Id. (pointing out the dangers created by requiring citizens to disclose their social security
numbers for use as passwords).
60 Solove, supra note 33, at 120.
61 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 et seq. (Westlaw 2015).
62 Id. § 2701 et seq.
63 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986).
64 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 373, 390–411 (2014) (discussing how changes in the technologies that make up the Internet
have made the ECPA outdated).
65 Id. at 390–91.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 391–93.
9
Wheatley: Do-It-Yourself Privacy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2015
274 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
content at risk.  This has resulted in a paradigm in which stored commu-
nications can now tell much more about a person than information dis-
closed in real time, because stored communications have the potential to
include all of a person’s online activity going back decades.68  Now that
technology has broken down the wall between real-time communications
and stored records, there should be an equal level of protection for per-
sonal information regardless of its temporal status.
An additional outdated feature of the ECPA is its reliance on the
distinction between providers of Electronic Communications Service
(ECS)69 and Remote Computing Service (RCS).70  The ECS protections
covered email, and the RCS protections covered “contents of communi-
cations transmitted for remote storage and processing by services availa-
ble to the public.”71  If content falls within neither of these categories it
is not protected under the Act.72  In 1986 this dichotomy made sense, but
modernly it leaves many aspects of the Internet unprotected, such as
search queries.73  Additionally, many service providers on the Internet
today perform multi-functional roles, such as messaging, chat, photo-
graph hosting, and bulletin board services.74  Relying on the Act to pro-
tect content held by these multi-functional providers means that content
consumers share with a single provider will be afforded varied levels of
protection based on whether the provider is acting as an ECS or RCS
with regard to that specific content at the relevant time.75  It is time to let
go of this old dichotomy, which has been outpaced by technology and no
longer reflects the nature of the Internet.
Another way that the ECPA is ill-equipped to handle the current
state of the Internet is its failure to tackle the problem of territoriality.76
The ECPA was drafted before the advent of the World Wide Web, and as
such it does not address the fact that data can now be transferred to or
stored in just about any country in the world.77  It is now common for a
company headquartered in the United States to have customers in Europe
68 Id. at 393.
69 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(15) (Westlaw 2015) (“‘[E]lectronic communication service’ means
any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications.”).
70 Id. § 2711(2) (“‘[R]emote computing service’ means the provision to the public of com-
puter storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.”).
71 Kerr, supra note 64, at 395.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 395–96 (“ECPA likely offers no protection for access to stored search queries, how-
ever, because it does not fit the 1986 dichotomies codified by the statute.”).
74 Id. at 397 (providing Facebook as an example of a service provider that wears many hats).
75 Id. at 397–98.
76 Id. at 406.
77 Id.
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and its servers in Asia.  The Act provides no answers for whose laws or
what factors should control how the data is handled, whether it is the
location of the data, the location of the business holding it, or the loca-
tion of its sender or receiver.78  The truly global nature of the Internet
requires that for any new federal privacy legislation to be effective, it
must address how data is handled in the international context.
The current administration has stated its interest in updating the
Wiretap Act to coincide with the modern realities of Internet use,79 but
so far Congress has failed to do so.  Congress has chosen to focus instead
on crafting industry-specific laws80 and has left it up to the states to
develop a “hodgepodge” of privacy laws.81  This can make compliance
difficult for companies that seek to do business online,82 and it offers
residents of different states fluctuating levels of privacy protection.83
Although the Wiretap Act is outdated, plaintiffs frequently assert
claims under the Act for violations of their informational privacy.84  This
is likely due, at least in part, to the fact that the statute does not require
plaintiffs to show damage arising out of the alleged violations of their
privacy.85  This allows privacy plaintiffs to overcome a difficult hurdle,
as there are frequently no concrete harms for courts to latch onto in pri-
vacy claims.86
78 Id. at 407–08.
79 WHITE HOUSE, supra note 31, at 35 n.42 (“The Administration is separately considering the
need to amend laws pertaining to the government’s access to data in the possession of private par-
ties, including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, to address changes in technology.”).
80 See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq. (Westlaw 2015); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified
as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
81 Glancy, supra note 17, at 359 n.6.
82 WHITE HOUSE, supra note 31, at 39.
83 For a thorough treatment of state privacy laws, see generally Jonathan D. Frieden, Charity
M. Price & Leigh M. Murray, Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Leveraging Private Enforcement
To Improve Internet Privacy, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1671 (2011).
84 See, e.g., In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067,
1071–72 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that plaintiffs alleged violations of ECPA when Google inter-
cepted usernames, passwords, and emails from their wireless networks with its street view cars
equipped with “packet sniffers”); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712–13 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (noting that plaintiffs alleged violation of the Wiretap Act when Facebook shared their
personal information with third-party advertisers); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F.
Supp. 2d 299, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that plaintiffs alleged violations of ECPA due to airline
disclosing passenger information to a third party); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d
1196 (D.N.D. 2004) (same); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ.04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004
WL 1278459 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (same).
85 18 U.S.C.A. § 2520 (Westlaw 2015).
86 See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 486
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Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and so a federal court will
be quick to dismiss a claim for lack of standing if the plaintiff is unable
to show injury from an alleged privacy violation.87  For a plaintiff to
have standing, he or she must show  “(1) [he or she has] suffered an
‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly tracea-
ble to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as op-
posed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.”88  Privacy plaintiffs often run afoul of the standing
test in that without monetary damage arising from their privacy viola-
tions, they are unable to demonstrate they have suffered “injury in fact”
that is “concrete and particularized.”89  However, it is still possible to get
standing from a statute such as the ECPA, which provides a remedy
without requiring a separate showing of damages.90
Without such a statute, even when a plaintiff has suffered economic
harm as a result of trying to mitigate an anticipated future privacy viola-
tion, the Supreme Court has held that such an injury is too speculative for
standing.91  In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Court held that
plaintiffs could not “manufacture standing” based on their fears of a
speculative future harm and the money they spent in order to safeguard
against surveillance of their client communications.92  This strict reading
of the imminence requirement for standing further restricts the situations
in which a privacy plaintiff may bring a claim absent a showing of an
imminent violation.
87 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).
88 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81
(2000) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61).
89 See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Ohio 2014)
(finding plaintiffs had no standing even though their personal information was hacked from the
insurance carrier, because there was no evidence they had suffered economic harm as a result); In re
Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 11–MD–02264 JSW, 2013 WL 1283236 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 26, 2013) (finding Google’s collection of PII without disclosure or consent did not result in
sufficient diminution in value to establish standing); Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 5:12–CV–01399
EJD, 2012 WL 5471149 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (finding plaintiff had no standing because he
could not show that Yahoo’s disclosure of his personal information caused him to suffer harm);
Cherny v. Emigrant Bank, 604 F. Supp. 2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding plaintiffs had no standing
because they could show no injury beyond the receipt of spam from the bank’s disclosure of cus-
tomer information in violation of its own privacy policy).
90 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“The actual or threatened injury required by
Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148–50 (2013) (finding plaintiffs chal-
lenging a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act did not have standing because it was
only speculative that the government would target them for surveillance).
92 Id. at 1151.
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol45/iss3/4
2015] Do-It-Yourself Privacy 277
Conversely, a plaintiff seeking to bring a claim under the Wiretap
Act merely has to demonstrate that the statute was violated.93  This fea-
ture of the Act allows privacy plaintiffs to sidestep the standing hurdle,
but the poor fit of the statute to the modern Internet means that even if a
plaintiff gains standing through the ECPA, often he or she will not have a
claim under the Act.94
One of the first cases in which private plaintiffs asserted a violation
of the ECPA was In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litigation.95  In that
case, the plaintiffs contended that Doubleclick Inc., a targeted advertis-
ing company, used “cookies” to track them online and compile volumi-
nous consumer profiles based on the sites they visited, in violation of the
ECPA.96  However, Doubleclick tracked consumers only when they vis-
ited sites affiliated with Doubleclick, i.e., sites that used Doubleclick’s
targeted ad banners.97  For that reason, the court held Doubleclick’s use
of cookies did not violate the Wiretap Act, because one of the parties of
the tracked communication, the affiliated website, obviously consented
to the use of cookies when it chose to utilize Doubleclick’s services.98
Therefore, the cookies fell under the exception to the Wiretap Act that
applies when one party to a communication consents to a third party’s
access.99
Doubleclick was notable because it allowed interception of consum-
ers’ personal information without their consent.  It stands for the proposi-
tion that a third party may collect the PII a consumer enters into a given
site, as long as the site consents to the acquisition.100
In a more recent case, In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, plaintiffs
attempted to use the ECPA to claim that Facebook violated their infor-
93 In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11–MD–02250–LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (“[S]tatutory standing under the Wiretap Act does not require a separate show-
ing of injury, but merely provides that any person whose electronic communication is intercepted,
disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of the Act may in a civil action recover from the entity
which engaged in that violation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
94 See, e.g., In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (find-
ing plaintiffs had no claim under ECPA because the advertisers were a party to the communication);
Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (D.N.D. 2004) (finding plaintiffs had no
claim under ECPA because airline was not an “electronic communications service” provider); In re
Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ.04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 1278459, at *2 (D. Minn. June 6,
2004) (same); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306–07, 310
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding plaintiffs had no claim under ECPA because airline was not an “electronic
communications service” provider nor a “remote computing service” provider).
95 In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
96 Id. at 502.
97 Id. at 504.
98 Id. at 510.
99 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(c)(2) (Westlaw 2015) (providing for exceptions to the Act when
authorized by a user of the service in question).
100 In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 510, 514.
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mational privacy through its disclosure to third-party advertisers.101  The
complaint focused on users who clicked banner ads they were shown in
Facebook.102  When users clicked the ads, Facebook would send person-
ally identifiable information about the users to third-party advertisers.103
The court found that Facebook’s actions did not violate the ECPA,
because by clicking the advertisements either the users were contacting
the advertiser, or they were contacting Facebook to pass their interest on
to the advertiser.104  The court determined that under either theory
Facebook’s actions fell under a consent exception to the ECPA, because
when users clicked on the banner ads they were attempting to communi-
cate with the advertisers.105  Thus, the advertisers were the intended re-
cipients of the communication, and Facebook was authorized to send
them user data.106
In re Facebook is unsettling, because the court did not appear to
consider the amount of user information that Facebook sent to the adver-
tisers, only that it could send user information to the advertisers.  This
fails to take into account the context-based expectations of users that
their personal information will not be shared with third-party advertisers
merely because they click on advertisements.107
The cases looked at thus far have demonstrated that the ECPA often
leaves plaintiffs without cognizable claims when they allege violations of
their informational privacy.  In the last two cases, plaintiffs were con-
cerned about defendant activity that went beyond their reasonable expec-
tations under the circumstances.  Although it appears that the plaintiffs
did in fact suffer violations of their privacy, the ECPA was not the right
vehicle for them to use for litigation.  Although the ECPA helped them
get standing, it did not assist them to state a claim or obtain relief.
In contrast to the plaintiffs above, the FTC has been very successful
in bringing actions against companies it has determined were behaving in
an unfair or deceptive manner.  While the FTC’s record with consent
decrees has been very influential in the privacy community, it is not
without certain drawbacks.  The next Part will analyze the FTC’s role in
privacy enforcement.
101 In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
102 Id. at 711.
103 Id. at 713.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(3)(a) (Westlaw 2015) (“[A] person or entity providing an elec-
tronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any com-
munication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof) . . . .” (emphasis added)).
107 See generally Nissenbaum, supra note 23, at 32.
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III. THE FTC’S ROLE
In the large hole left by the absence of any comprehensive online
federal privacy law, the FTC108 has become the de facto privacy regula-
tor for the federal government.109  The FTC enforces consumers’ online
privacy by targeting companies that engage in unfair competition and
deceptive practices, as defined in section 5 of the FTC Act.110  The FTC
also brings complaints against companies that have self-certified as Safe
Harbors111 under the U.S.-EU framework.112  While the FTC has a near-
perfect record of obtaining a consent order once it brings a complaint
against a company,113 its relatively small staff of personnel and limited
budget restricts the number of complaints it can bring in any given
year.114  Despite this limitation, the FTC Act does not provide a private
cause of action for consumers to bring their own claims against those
who have violated their privacy rights.115  Even so, the strategies the
FTC has developed to bring complaints against violators will be useful to
consider in developing new federal privacy legislation.
108 FED. TRADE COMMISSION, www.ftc.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).  The FTC keeps a
record on its website of all the cases it has initiated thus far.  They can be found by accessing the
“cases and proceedings” heading under the “enforcement” tab found on the main page.  In addition,
the International Association of Privacy Professionals has released a casebook of FTC Privacy Law
that summarizes, organizes, and tags all the FTC settlements to date to make them easier to search.
FTC Privacy Casebook, IAPP WESTIN RESEARCH CTR., www.privacyassociation.org/resources/ftc-
casebook (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
109 WHITE HOUSE, supra note 31, at 29.
110 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Westlaw 2015).
111 Complaint at 17–18, In re Facebook Inc., File No. 092-3184, No. C-4365 (F.T.C. July 27,
2012) (“The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework provides a method for U.S. companies to transfer
personal data outside of the European Union (‘EU’) that is consistent with the requirements of the
European Union Data Protection Directive (‘Directive’). The Directive sets forth EU requirements
for privacy and the protection of personal data. . . . To join the Safe Harbor, a company must self-
certify to Commerce that it complies with seven principles and related requirements that have been
deemed to meet the EU’s adequacy standard.”).
112 See, e.g., id. at 17–19 (stating Facebook’s retroactive change of users’ privacy settings
without obtaining consent constituted a deceptive practice, and as such did not comply with the Safe
Harbor requirements of notice and choice); Complaint at 6–8, In re Google, File No. 102-3136, No.
C-4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011) (stating Google’s use of Gmail user information in the Google Buzz
social media platform without first providing notice and obtaining consent constituted a deceptive
practice, and as such did not comply with the Safe Harbor requirement of choice).
113 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 28, at 606.
114 Id. at 600.
115 Id. at 610.  To make up for the FTC’s limited size, state attorneys general are also author-
ized to bring complaints for unfair and deceptive practices, but this Comment will not discuss their
role, because it is concerned with creating a comprehensive federal legislation that empowers private
plaintiffs to defend themselves against privacy violations.  This Comment argues that a single com-
prehensive federal privacy law would be superior in that it would foster consumer confidence and
allow for greater ease of compliance by businesses in the national and international context.
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Chief among the FTC’s arsenal is the power to bring complaints
against companies that engage in unfair or deceptive business prac-
tices.116  Unfair business practices may include retroactively changing a
company’s privacy policy without notifying users or giving them the
choice to opt out, collecting user data without notice, or implementing
substandard security procedures.117  A deceptive business practice may
consist of a company sharing user information with third-party advertis-
ers despite stating previously that it would never do so without user noti-
fication,118 or a company illicitly collecting personal information from
consumers.119  The FTC must weigh an alleged unfair practice against
any countervailing benefits to consumers resulting from the practice.120
Only if the FTC finds there is a substantial injury to consumers, and no
comparable benefit to consumers, may it bring a complaint for unfairness
against a company.121  Thus, there have been many more complaints al-
leging deception than unfairness.122
Utilizing these two principles, the FTC has developed a robust re-
cord of settlements that privacy professionals pay close attention to in
order to determine best practices in the area of informational privacy.123
While settlements do not set precedent, their influence in the professional
privacy community means that companies treat consent orders much like
judicial decisions that have the weight of precedent.124  This is true even
though consent orders do not require companies to admit to any wrong-
doing.125  An added benefit of settling is efficiency, in that the FTC and
the company in question do not have to tie up the courts and spend vast
sums of money in litigation.
116 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Westlaw 2015).
117 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 28, at 628 (“[U]nfairness actions are based on at least five
distinct theories: retroactive policy changes, deceitful data collection, improper use of data, unfair
design, and unfair information security practices.”).
118 See, e.g., Complaint at 11–14, In re Facebook Inc., File No. 092-3184, No. C-4365
(F.T.C. July 27, 2012).
119 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 28, at 628 (“The FTC has developed a theory of deception
that not only includes broken promises of privacy and security, but also a general theory of decep-
tion in obtaining personal information and deception due to insufficient notice of privacy-invasive
activities.”).
120 Id. at 638 (describing the “three-part test” for FTC unfairness actions).
121 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(n) (Westlaw 2015).
122 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 28, at 628 n.211 (“Of the 154 privacy-related complaints
analyzed for this Article, eighty-seven unambiguously relied upon a theory of deception in alleging a
violation of Section 5 [of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45], whereas there were only forty-six com-
plaints that unambiguously relied upon a theory of unfairness in alleging a violation of Section 5.”).
123 Id. at 607.
124 Id. at 621–622.
125 See, e.g., Decision and Order at 1, In re Designerware, LLC, File No. 112-3151, No. C-
4390 (F.T.C. 2013) (“[T]he signing of said consent agreement is for settlement purposes only and
does not constitute an admission by the respondent that the law has been violated . . . .”).
16
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However, the FTC is limited to seeking equitable relief for most
violations of the FTC Act.126  This means that often companies get away
without paying any fines or damages.  On the other hand, the FTC has
made a habit of imposing twenty-year audit periods in its consent or-
ders,127 with the audits to be conducted by qualified third parties, which
are their own unique burden and a long time to be under the watchful eye
of the FTC.128  The consent orders, in addition to requiring regular au-
dits, also impose hefty civil fines if they are violated.  Google was re-
cently found to have violated its 2011 Google Buzz consent order by
making misrepresentations to Safari users about placement of cookies on
the Safari web browser, and it was fined $22.5 million, the largest fine
the FTC has obtained for a violation of one of its orders to date.129
In addition to its deceptive-practice authority, the FTC also can
bring complaints against companies for violation of the U.S.-EU Safe
Harbor principles.130  A company that holds itself out as a safe harbor
claims that it upholds the seven privacy principles included in the Euro-
pean Union Data Protection Directive.131
Because a company must self-certify as a safe harbor, if the FTC
determines that a company has not upheld the seven principles, it can
also bring a complaint for deceptive practice in that the company held
126 15 U.S.C.A. § 53(b) (Westlaw 2015).
127 See, e.g., Decision and Order at 8, In re Facebook, Inc., File No. 092-3184, No. C-4365
(F.T.C. July 27, 2012); Decision and Order at 7, In re Google, Inc., File No. 102-3136, No. C-4336
(F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011); Decision and Order at 6, In re Myspace LLC, File No. 102-3058, No. C-
4369 (F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2012); Decision and Order at 6, In re Twitter, Inc., File No. 092-3093, No. C-
4316 (F.T.C. Mar. 2, 2011).
128 As part of its twenty-year audit period, the FTC often requires companies to institute new
comprehensive privacy programs to address continuing and developing privacy risks. See, e.g., De-
cision and Order at 4–5, In re Facebook, Inc., File No. 092-3184, No. C-4365.
129 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement by FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection
Director David Vladeck Regarding Judges Approval of Google Safari Settlement (Nov. 20, 2012),
available at www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/11/statement-ftc-bureau-consumer-pro-
tection-director-david-vladeck.
130 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 28, at 643, 647–48.
131 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/
eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Dec. 18, 2013) (listing the seven principles as notice (telling
consumers what personal information is collected and for what purposes it is used), choice (allowing
consumers to opt out of transfer to third parties or the use of information for secondary purposes, and
requiring opt-in for sensitive information), transfers to third parties (requiring that the third party
maintain a similar level of privacy protection), access (allowing consumers to check their data for
accuracy and to correct or delete it), security (maintaining reasonable security measures for data to
guard against loss or unauthorized access), data integrity (taking reasonable steps to ensure con-
sumer data is reliable and accurate), and enforcement (maintaining mechanisms for individual com-
plaints and procedures for ensuring compliance with the above principles)).
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itself out as maintaining a certain level of privacy protection that it did
not actually provide.132
While the FTC settlement history is impressive and expansive, it
suffers from several deficiencies.  First, the FTC may use its administra-
tive authority only against companies engaging in unfair or deceptive
practices.133  If a company provides notice to consumers in its terms of
service for wildly out-of-context sharing of personal information, the
FTC is powerless to bring an action against it.134  Second, because com-
panies choose to settle with the FTC instead of going to trial, there is no
privacy precedent being created by courts.135  This results in only pri-
vacy professionals studying the terms of the settlements, with most con-
sumers being unaware of the current state of FTC privacy law.
Furthermore, while privacy professionals may treat FTC orders as prece-
dential for practical purposes, there is nothing preventing the FTC from
changing its standards at any time.  Third, companies that settle with the
FTC are not required to admit any wrongdoing, and so they escape the
reputational damage they may otherwise incur from adverse court judg-
ments.  This reduces their incentive to get privacy right the first time
around.  Fourth, because the FTC cannot impose statutory fines as a pen-
alty, companies have the potential to profit enormously from violating
consumer privacy while having to repay only a small amount.  Even
when Google was fined $22.5 million for violating its consent order, the
stiffest penalty the FTC has imposed thus far, the fine was a drop in the
bucket compared to the over $50 billion Google made in revenue that
same year.136  Finally, the FTC Act does not provide a private cause of
action for consumers whose privacy is violated.  If the FTC does not
consider a company’s violations to be worth the trouble to begin pro-
ceedings against it, consumers are left with no remedy.  A new federal
privacy law could remedy these deficiencies by empowering consumers
to seek redress for violations of their privacy by embodying the same
principles the FTC uses to obtain its settlements.
132 See, e.g., Complaint, In re Progressive Gaitways LLC, File No. 092-3141, No. C-4271
(F.T.C. Nov. 9, 2009).
133 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Westlaw 2015).
134 Solove, supra note 22, at 1880 (“Consent legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or
disclosure of personal data.”).
135 Cf. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 28, at 619–20 (noting that while the FTC’s consent
decree settlements do not technically create precedent, they are treated as having precedential power
by privacy professionals).
136 Google Inc. Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2012 Results, GOOGLE INVESTOR
RELATIONS (Jan. 22, 2013), http://investor.google.com/earnings/2012/Q4_google_earnings.html.
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IV. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A new federal privacy law should utilize the experience the FTC has
gained through its settlements to provide consumers with a private right
of action for violations of their privacy.  An ideal law would also utilize
the “Fair Information Practice Principles” of transparency, notice, con-
trol, access, and security to require companies to maintain a new mini-
mum level of privacy protection.137  The FTC has recommended multiple
times that new privacy legislation be enacted to embody these principles
and make them applicable to any business that collects consumer per-
sonal data online.138  Further, new legislation should create a standard
based on reasonable consumer expectations (based on context), holding
accountable any company that collects, uses, processes, discloses, or
stores personally identifiable information.  In addition, the legislation
should provide a private right of action based on a violation of any of its
provisions, without requiring a separate showing of harm by a plaintiff.
The Obama Administration recently released a proposed bill, the “Con-
sumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015,” which included many of these
principles.139  Notably absent from the bill, however, was a private right
of action.
The benefits of new legislation are readily apparent.  Giving con-
sumers a private right of action without having to show damages would
allow more privacy violations to be remedied in court.  This would create
a new wave of judicial precedent, a necessary feature of our common-
law system.  It would also result in improved transparency of corporate
practices, as businesses would have an increased incentive to demon-
strate their compliance with the new legislation. Additionally, the up-
dated legislation would save plaintiffs from trying to force their
arguments to fit outdated statutes, or from relying on negligence theories
for recovery, where proving causation and damages in privacy cases is
137 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS 38–42 (1973), available at www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf (originally
describing the Fair Information Practice Principles).  The FIPPs were later expanded by the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to include eight principles. ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING GUIDELINES GOV-
ERNING THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980).
138 FTC, supra note 24, at 12–13; FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 36–37 (2000), available at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-com
mission-report/privacy2000text.pdf.
139 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY
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difficult.140  Furthermore, the new legislation would ideally provide for
statutory damages, which would serve as a deterrent to companies that
otherwise may not take privacy protection seriously and would allow po-
tential plaintiffs to recover for the aggravation suffered due to having
their privacy violated.
In the Target credit card breach example that began this Comment,
consumers who want to bring lawsuits will be forced, in the absence of
existing federal privacy legislation, to center their complaints on claims
of negligence by Target or violations of state consumer protection stat-
utes.  This means that plaintiffs in different states may receive varying
levels of protection from their state statutes.  This will also limit the dam-
ages to which they will be entitled, because they may not be able to show
any concrete harm resulting from their stolen credit card numbers beyond
the cost of credit-monitoring programs.141  This will do nothing to com-
pensate them for the aggravation that results from having to deal with
potential identity theft, unless it rises to the level that a court will be
willing to recognize.  New privacy legislation could provide victims of
the Target breach with a clear right of action based on Target’s alleged
failure to maintain sufficient security procedures for their personal data.
This would also allow them to seek compensatory and punitive damages
resulting from the breach.142
Similarly, plaintiffs from In re Facebook Privacy Litigation143 could
have used new privacy legislation to claim that Facebook’s broken prom-
ise not to share user data with advertisers constituted a deceptive act that
violated the principles of notice and choice.  Instead of having their
claims dismissed, they could have recovered for Facebook’s disregard
for their informational privacy.
While the FTC settlement with Facebook served to prevent that sort
of retroactive policy changing and promise breaking, it did not put reme-
dial funds in the hands of individual users.  Although Facebook profited
by selling user information to advertisers in violation of its policy, the
140 Solove, supra note 33, at 115–16.
141 Id.
142 As of Mar. 18, 2015, the consumer plaintiffs to the Target breach class action lawsuit have
arrived at a proposed settlement agreement with Target, now awaiting final approval, in the amount
of $10 million.  Settlement Agreement and Release at 7, In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec.
Breach Litig., No. 14-2522 (PAM/JJK) (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2015), available at https://targetbreach-
settlement.com/Portals/0/Documents/Settlement%20Agreement.pdf.  To obtain actual “reimburse-
ment of losses” up to $10,000, class members must be able provide documentation of losses they
incurred from the breach. Detailed Notice, TARGET BREACH SETTLEMENT, available at https://
targetbreachsettlement.com/Portals/0/Documents/DetailedNotice.pdf (last updated Apr. 30, 2015).
However, class members who file valid claims under the settlement without documentation will only
be entitled to a general share of the settlement, which may be as little as $30. Id.
143 In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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users themselves received nothing in compensation for the violation of
their privacy rights.  New legislation could remedy this situation by pro-
viding for recovery by users.
Accountability should also be a key feature of any new federal pri-
vacy legislation.144  The Centre for Information Policy Leadership has
listed the essential elements of accountability:
1. Organisation commitment to accountability and adoption of inter-
nal policies consistent with external criteria.
2. Mechanisms to put privacy policies into effect, including tools,
training and education.
3. Systems for internal, ongoing oversight and assurance reviews
and external verification.
4. Transparency and mechanisms for individual participation.
5. Means for remediation and external enforcement.145
The accountability principles listed above bear a strong similarity to
FTC settlements requiring companies to institute comprehensive privacy
programs.146  The elements of accountability essentially require a com-
pany that collects personally identifiable data to demonstrate a commit-
ment to privacy principles and create a robust program that provides a
comprehensive scheme for carrying out those principles.147  While this is
a higher bar than exists currently, there are many companies that already
meet this standard.148  In addition, adoption of the accountability princi-
ples in federal legislation will bring the United States more in line with
the privacy laws of other developed countries—a laudable objective, as
the Internet does not function by normal jurisdictional rules or physical
boundaries, and many companies are international in scope.149  Further-
144 THE CENTRE FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, DATA PROTECTION ACCOUNTABILITY: THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 3–4 (2009), available at www.huntonfiles.com/files/webupload/CIPL_Gal
way_Accountability_Paper.pdf.  The Centre for Information Policy Leadership defines accountabil-
ity as: “shift[ing] the focus of privacy governance to an organisation’s ability to demonstrate its
capacity to achieve specified privacy objectives. It involves setting privacy protection goals for com-
panies based on criteria established in law, self-regulation and best practices, and vesting the organi-
sation with both the ability and the responsibility to determine appropriate, effective measures to
reach those goals. . . . An accountable organisation demonstrates commitment to accountability,
implements data privacy policies linked to recognised external criteria, and implements mechanisms
to ensure responsible decision-making about the management and protection of data.” Id.
145 Id. at 4.
146 See, e.g., Decision and Order at 4–5, In re Facebook, Inc., File No. 092-3184, No. C-4365
(F.T.C. 2012).
147 THE CENTRE FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, supra note 144, at 8–9.
148 Member Companies, CENTRE FOR INFO. POL’Y LEADERSHIP, www.informationpolicycentre
.com/member_companies (last visited April 20, 2015).
149 THE CENTRE FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, supra note 144, at 7.  The EU’s Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Canada’s Personal Information Protection
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more, the FTC already incorporates accountability principles into its con-
sent orders, demonstrating that federal regulators consider accountability
to be vital to privacy protection.
CONCLUSION
Any company that makes a profit from the collection of personally
identifiable information should be tasked with the proper use, storage,
and disposal of that information.  New federal privacy legislation could
accomplish this task by requiring companies to maintain adequate stan-
dards to safeguard this information utilizing the principles described
above, with power given to private plaintiffs to enforce those principles
if they are violated.
The current sectorial framework focuses on a select few industries
and leaves large swaths of Internet activity without statutory protection.
This system relies on self-regulation by companies, leaving the FTC and
state attorneys general to bring enforcement actions against the largest
infringers.  However, the limited resources of the FTC, along with differ-
ing state privacy laws, mean that consumers receive varied levels of pro-
tection from national and international companies.  These same
companies must also find ways to conform and adapt to differing stan-
dards in the absence of comprehensive federal privacy legislation.
The Obama Administration, regulators, businesses, and consumers
all support new federal legislation.150  In order to maintain the strength of
the developing digital economy, and to safeguard consumer trust, Con-
gress needs to enact new comprehensive privacy legislation that accom-
plishes the goals stated above.  This would help ensure that the United
States does not slip behind in this important area as privacy continues to
be a dominant issue in the twenty-first century and beyond.
and Electronic Documents Act, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Privacy Framework all
utilize accountability principles. Id.
150 There are, of course, some exceptions.
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